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prepare and address these new threats to our freedom or face a future filled with uncertainty.
We do not know the true face of our next adversary or the exact method of engagement. The threat may come from terrorists, but it could come in the form of … This uncertainty requires us to move away from past threat-based view of the world and force development. WE must change. We must envision and invest in the future today so we can defend our homeland and our freedoms tomorrow.
The future demands we move towards a capabilities-based approach as articulated in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review. This approach focuses more on how the United States can defeat a broad array of capabilities that any adversary may employ rather than who the adversaries are and where they may threaten joint forces or US interest. The joint force will have attributes to make it fully integrated expeditionary in nature, networked, decentralized, adaptable, able to achieve decision superiority, and lethal." Force (USAF) is taking a lead role by institutionalizing major initiatives in compliance with the SECDEF's directive. The foremost USAF initiative is the transformation from threat based planning to a capabilities based planning approach. The focus is on a planning and modernization investment process that delivers warfighting effects and the capabilities to attain those effects.
The USAF delivers combat capability through the employment of its Air and Space This paper will discuss the adequacy of the CONOPS to identify and assess USAF capabilities used in capabilities-based planning. Presentation format will be from general to specific, providing broad explanations up front and focusing to detailed analysis of CONOPS at the end. The first step is to provide background information and key definitions to help understand why the USAF initiative for developing CONOPS. Secondly, an examination of one of the six CONOPS applied to a hypothetical theater situation to demonstrate how capabilities are derived. The theater situation used will parallel a typical fourth generation threat we could expect to deal with in today's global strategic environment. Finally, this paper will turn to detailing the overall process of risk mitigation via the CRRA.
TRANSFORMATION
As stated by the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), "The purpose of transformation is to maintain or improve US military preeminence in the face of potential disproportionate discontinuous changes in the strategic environment." The US military is striving to fulfill its obligation to change set forth by the SECDEF. The charter of change is manifest in the process of transformation. Transformation is viewed quite differently throughout DoD and the service communities. Regardless, transformation involves a different approach to the old way of doing business. The US military must adapt new fundamental approaches to preserve and maintain the current technological and operational advantage it holds against a changing enemy. Although the US military currently maintains a technological advantage, technology itself does not guarantee success.
The USAF transformation discussion begins with a service definition of transformation:
A process by which the military achieves and maintains asymmetric advantage through changes in operational concepts, organizational structure, and/or technologies that significantly improve warfighting capabilities or ability to meet the demands of a changing security environment.
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The definition recognizes two significant points in regards to the transformation process.
First, the incorporation of rapidly advancing technologies needs to improve the USAF warfighting capabilities and secondly, changes in the international security environment are forcing adaptation of new approaches to maintain the asymmetric advantage. The USAF embraces these two important points in its transformation process by integrating advanced technology into its capabilities base and analyzing the emerging security environment in terms of current potential new threat capabilities.
The USAF is transforming to capabilities based planning to better meet the demands of a changing strategic security environment. The goal is to proceed from the previous program centric based approach to a more comprehensive and responsive effects based capability focused approach. "The Air Staff is working hard to lay the foundation for the next step in our transformation to a capabilities-focused Expeditionary Air and Space Force. Our goal is to make warfighting effects, and the capabilities we need to achieve them, the drivers for everything we do." 5 The USAF, as a part of its transformation process, is instituting capabilities based planning to identify the capabilities required to meet the needs of the Combatant Commanders in support of joint operations in the future.
CAPABILITES-BASED APPROACH
The explanation of capabilities based planning first begins with an understanding of the capabilities based approach. This approach focuses on defeating a broad spectrum of enemy capabilities any time, anywhere in the new strategic environment. Historically, US military force structure has been a program (platform/system) based garrison force built around a relatively static and predictable enemy threat. Today, US forces face a much more elusive and unpredictable threat. The enemy poses a great danger in his ability to strike asymmetrically.
The strategic responsibility of the US military is to mitigate this uncertainty and apply combat capability against an enemy's capability anywhere around the globe. Therefore, a shift from the threat based program centric force development to a capabilities based approach is warranted to allow application of desired capabilities for any given military operation. This change in approach, capabilities versus threat based approach, is a cornerstone for understanding capabilities based planning. It allows the USAF to focus on capabilities as opposed to systems and/or systems platforms. Each USAF system and/or systems platform will be measured by its contribution of capabilities to the joint force. This shift of how programs (systems and/or systems platforms) are reviewed under capabilities based planning is discussed in the CRRA section. This approach will require thinking in new ways of how to employ combinations of systems to achieve synergistic effects with multi-spectrum capabilities.
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CAPABILITY BASED PLANNING, A STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE
The capabilities based planning process is rapidly evolving and each service is helping to define how the final model will function. A general description of how the capabilities based planning process might function comes from a basic understanding of supply and demand ( Figure 1 ). 
FIGURE 1. CAPABILITIES BASED PLANNING, A STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE
In the meantime, the USAF will continue to focus and refine its efforts to institutionalize capabilities based planning and deliver effects required by the Combatant Commanders.
Development and implementation of the USAF CONOPS are keys to success for capabilities based planning. The CONOPS are the foundation upon which capabilities planning rest.
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CONCEPTS OF OPERATIONS.
In the year 2000, the USAF began developing six CONOPS to support its contribution to the joint defense strategy. Six new CONOPS divisions on the USAF Air Staff in the Operations Requirements Directorate were created to connect capabilities-based planning around these CONOPS. All USAF operations, programming and budget decisions in turn are designed to support the capabilities defined by the CONOPS. 9 The CONOPS are: Global Strike, Global Persistent Attack, Homeland Security, Nuclear Response, Global Mobility and Space & C4ISR.
The CONOPS, with the addition of Agile Combat Support which transcends all the CONOPS address all the current and future capabilities areas of the USAF. The purpose of the CONOPS is to provide a process for determining the future requirements for the USAF. The CONOPS is the backbone for planning, programming, budgeting, requirements and acquisition processes.
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The CONOPS will serve as the USAF centerpiece guide for planning, programming, requirements reform and acquisition. The USAF reorganization centers on CONOPS because while Congress focuses on money and the Office for Secretary of Defense (OSD) on programs, the USAF's expertise is contained within the CONOPS. The CONOPS defines how we plan on using the programmed systems that Congress budgets. The CONOPS flow directly from the QDR strategy, Joint Operations Concepts (JOCs) and supporting Joint Functional Capabilities.
The CONOPS parallel the JOCs while the USAF's support capabilities parallel the Joint Functional Capabilities.
FIGURE 2. CAPABILITIES BASED CONCEPTS OF OPERATION 11
The CONOPS describe the capabilities and effects the USAF brings to the fight. The USAF binned its capabilities under the CONOPS (Figure 2 ). Each "bin" of capabilities in a particular CONOPS represents combinations of individual systems and programs. The CONOPS cover all current and future USAF capability areas.
CONOPS CHAMPIONS
Each CONOPS has an assigned 0-6 advocate called a Champion. The Champion and his/her staff are responsible for the capabilities the USAF has, or needs to develop. These teams of operational and system experts, evaluate how the USAF is meeting challenges in realizing the USAF vision. The team focus is to look from today and anticipate the challenges the USAF and joint community will face in carrying out the national security strategy. The CONOPS are written by the component commanders (Air Combat Command, Air Mobility
Command and Air Force Space Command) and approved by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force.
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The following paragraphs present each of the six CONOPS with a brief explanation.
Several CONOPS provide key capabilities that support and/or enable all or some capabilities in the other CONOPS.
INDIVIDUAL CONOPS
The first CONOPS to discuss is Global Strike. It represents the first and most mature CONOPS developed by the USAF. Not all operational environments will be permissive and there will be attempts to prevent forces from establishing bases and building up capability at our own time, pace and place of choosing. The Global Strike CONOPS (GS) identifies necessary capabilities for the anti-access environment. It employs joint power projection capabilities to engage anti-access and high value targets. These anti-access capabilities are a direct threat to US forces and must be defeated prior to sending in less capable forces. As a result, GS gains access to denied battlespace and maintains battelspace access for all required joint/coalition follow-on operations.
Next is the Global Persistent Attack CONOPS (GPA). GPA assumes that permissible access conditions exist, attained by GS operations if warranted, and there is a need for persistent and sustained combat operations. GPA may require some of the same capabilities used for GS operations to engage emerging enemy anti-access threats to sustain the battlespace for GPA operations. Achieving and maintaining air, space, information and decision dominance is an ongoing challenge that continues into GPA operations. The Space and Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance CONOPS (Space & C4ISR) provides the global vigilance necessary to allow commanders to achieve decision dominance over an adversary. In addition, global awareness must be able to provide detailed 24/7 coverage in all conditions over a specific area to support operations. Commanders operating in an Area of Responsibility (AOR) must achieve local decision dominance and the ability to respond to emerging situations in fractions of an hour.
Finally, the USAF wants to move to an environment in which system platforms communicate directly with each other to exchange data thereby allowing people to focus on analyzing information and making decisions.
Another key enabling CONOPS is Global Mobility (GM). Getting the warfighter and materials to the fight on time, on target is a critical enabler. GM systems, combined with the command and control capabilities from the Space&C4ISR CONOPS, provide mobility Command and Control, air refueling operations, air mobility operations, aero medical evacuation, air insertion of forces into hostile territory, space lift, and the initial set up of bases in forward locations.
The logistical support necessary for GM and GPA operations is significantly different than for the GS CONOPS. This "agile" combat support is the foundation for all combat operations and transcends operations from strikes and raids to major conflict. Planners must select the appropriate forces for the adversary's capabilities and task organizes an Air and Space Expeditionary Force (ASEF) for the combatant commander to employ as part of the Joint Task
Force.
The Nuclear Response CONOPS (NR) address the fact that the USAF is still charged with ensuring the safety of the US as a nation. There are those in the world who have access to and the capability to employ weapons of mass destruction. To deter and defend the US against those threats, a reliable nuclear force remains key "top cover" for the nation.
Finally, as seen recently by the world trade center terrorist attacks, not all threats to the US are from weapons of mass destruction. In conjunction with the new Department of Homeland Security, the USAF must leverage its capabilities with joint and interagency efforts to prevent, protect and respond to threats against our homeland. This pertains to threats against our homeland whether within or beyond US territories.
The USAF has identified key systems for each CONOPS in two areas. The first is a "core" area that reflects a need to maintain certain baseline capabilities into the future. The second area is "transformational" systems that will enable more dramatic changes in how operations are conducted in the future. For example, the "smart tanker" initiative, placing communication relay equipment on aerial refueling platforms already airborne for other mission tasks, will allow greater distribution of information within an AOR without having to invest in more dedicated communications networks. This increased bandwidth will allow forces at all levels to share information, accelerating the pace and accuracy of operations. and Navy TLAM capability to provide the most advanced systems to gain access and minimize risk.
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CONOPS IN ACTION
Country X also possesses Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) capability and a decentralized C2 network which includes space based systems. In addition, latest generation Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs), fighter aircraft, WMD long range accurate delivery, anti-shipping mines and super quiet diesel submarines comprise the protection of country X. These systems protect and may employ a variety of CBRNE threats. Launch and storage facilities are scattered throughout the country requiring deep strike operations to engage the target set. In addition, the country is located at an extreme range from US forces.
This discussion focuses on USAF capabilities only. Depending on size, location and scope of operations, other service forces would jointly fill capability requirements. Location of country X may dictate which service provides the capabilities needed. Some scenarios may take place in a remote littoral region where Navy or Marine assets would the only logical choice to provide capabilities needed to achieve the desired effects.
GS will take down, degrade and/or destroy the IADS and HVTs to allow follow on operations. Establishing air dominance will allow friendly forces to conduct joint operations at the tempo, time and location of their choice. GS allows conventional forces protected battlespace to conduct movement in and around the joint operations area. GPA CONOPS is the follow-on to GS in maintaining and sustaining theater operations.
In this scenario the JFC determines what effects he will need to achieve his tactical, operational and strategic objectives. The JFC carefully analyzes his Course of Action (COA) to produce the right mix of effects that will ensure success. The following list represents what effects the JFC has decided he needs to combat the threat in this scenario:
• Complete battlespace awareness
• Ability to C2 global forces
• Surprise
• Freedom of maneuver 24/7
• Robust Information dominance
• Ability to rapidly mass effects when and where needed
• Force Protection against enemy WMD precision
• Flexible response options
To answer the JFC effects requirement, GS would employ core capabilities to satisfy the need. In the future, a joint "bin" of capabilities would be developed from which to pull and answer these requirements. Cross walking the JFC needs and the GS capabilities show the relationship for JFC needs and the ability for USAF forces to fulfill with capabilities. The GS capabilities are:
• Persistent multi-spectral, fused sensors
• Global C2
• Stealth
• Horizontally integrated systems of systems
• Range, payload, speed, maneuverability
• Robust all-weather delivery
• Increased standoff
• Overwhelming precision
• Support to widely dispersed maneuver forces
The USAF heavily invests in each of these GS capabilities. And through the careful development of the associated CONOPS, capabilities are linked with the effects desired. Target neutralization is an aggregate, top level capability and is comprised of numerous supporting capabilities. Each supporting capability is broken down further into more detailed and refined sub-capabilities. The sub-capabilities provide the refined description of specific capabilities the USAF pursues. The following is an expanded look at sub-capabilities applied to neutralizing the anti-access threat and the HVTs: 
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CONOPS RISK
CONOPS Champions play a key role in mitigating risk throughout CONOPS development.
They are charged with oversight of the entire development process and for communicating issues to senior leadership. CONOPS assessment and analysis is conducted by subject matter experts under the critical jurisdiction of the Champion. In the end, senior leadership is made aware of those capabilities necessary for the USAF to present the full range of ASEF power to the Combatant Commander. CONOPS Champions will integrate priorities among capabilities for review by the USAF corporate structure (AFCS). They will also participate in the Joint Requirements Oversight Council via USAF channels to ensure all CONOPS capabilities are addressed at the Functional Capability Boards to help ensure all programs are jointly accepted. 18 The primary objectives of the Champions are to: 1) Review and evaluate the CONOPS and see how the USAF forces fit into a joint environment to carry out a particular mission. 2) Lead the transition from threatbased planning to a capabilities-based approach. 3) Evaluate how the USAF budget supports the capabilities necessary to execute the CONOPS. This identifies shortfalls or gaps to be addressed through changes in doctrine and tactics, and/or new system development. In addition, the Champions will identify areas where the USAF can accept risk and re-direct investment to areas where the risk mitigation is required. Supported by CONOPS Champions, the six CONOPS will help guide the USAF's investment strategy for the future. 19 A closer look at the assessment and analysis process will provide helpful insight in determining the confidence level of CONOPS to derive capabilities needed.
ANALYSIS PROCESS
In order for the USAF to keep in front of warfighter needs, it must constantly review strategic guidance and planning documentation. The CRRA is the next stop in the process and the most important step for explaining the capabilities based planning concept. The CRRA is the analytical tool that closely focuses on and evaluates the CONOPS. It is the cornerstone assessment that provides several new benefits over past programmatic centric assessments. The output of the CRRA produces an inventory of current capabilities, shortfalls and most importantly direction for future acquisition decision making. Our current and future systems are viewed for how they contribute to warfighter needs and effects. The CRRA process is vital to the development and accuracy of the CONOPS derived capabilities and therefore will be analyzed in greater detail. 
CAPABILITIES REVIEW AND RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS
Again, the CRRA is the most important step in determining capability prioritization, gaps, shortfalls and COA solutions. The assessment analyzes joint warfighting capabilities and alerts USAF Senior leadership of problems and deficiencies. The CRRA process is not a panacea or catch all mechanism, but plays a significant role in the analysis process. Senior USAF Leadership depends on the CRRA process to yield valid information products that are used for current and future capability investment decisions. The CRRA process must be deliberate, detailed and decisive to prevent any oversight of capability deficiencies. Integration. The CONOPS and MCL feed this process the inventory of capabilities to examine.
CONOPS
The RATs assess capabilities for proficiency, sufficiency and risk. Areas are identified for further study and analysis. The grading criterion is subjective and uses subjective scoring to weight and detect areas of potentially unacceptable risk. Capability prioritization and gaps are generated in this phase. The next sub phase, Objective Problem Refinement and COA Analysis takes the initial gap list from subjective assessment, along with probable COAs that resolve the gap deficiency and bounce it against objective analysis. Modeling and simulation techniques are used to find acceptable COA optimal solutions using advanced analysis tools. The last sub phase, Subjective Roll-up of Capabilities and Integration, requires MAJCOM appointed Integration Teams and the RAT to validate capability prioritization and develop gap and shortfall COA solutions. Prioritizations and risks are then "racked and stacked" and solutions sets are tested. The process applies constraints and restraints to check solution feasibility. This is the first look at where the USAF can identify tradespace and force structure investment options.
Phase 3, Presentation, allows USAF senior leadership to review the shortfall list.
DOTMLPF concepts for feasibility are used to diagnose the CRRA findings. The outcomes are normally directives to the MAJCOMs via APPG and generation of capability roadmaps. The roadmaps identify the investment and reinvestment priorities integrated into the POM process.
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The CRRA evaluation of the CONOPS delivers a combat capability inventory that is prioritized, scrubbed for deficiencies (shortfalls) and decisive enough for future USAF investment strategy. The CRRA methodology provides a systematic process for determining what is needed, missing and redundant. CONOPS Champions, RATs and Integration Teams continue to improve the CRRA methods to ensure fidelity and accuracy.
The presentation of the CRRA process marks the end of the overall analysis process.
The analysis process will continue to develop and focus on capturing improvements as the USAF continues the journey towards perfecting CONOPS and its ability to adequately identify combat capabilities.
CONCLUSION
The six CONOPS are essential to the assist the Air Force leap into the 21 st Century transformation. The DoD and sister services must seek innovative ways to provide the combatant commanders with the warfighting combat capabilities necessary to create battlespace effects and win America's conflicts. Smaller force structure and dwindling defense dollars create the need for a fully integrated joint force that supports the defense strategy. The Air Force is motivated, committed and invested in its six CONOPS. The result is look ahead efficiencies to guide planning, programming and acquisition. 
TERMS
Capability--The ability to execute a specified course of action. It is defined by an operational user and expressed in broad operational terms in the format of an initial capabilities document or a DOTMLPF change recommendation. In the case of material proposals, the definition will progressively evolve to DOTMLPF performance attributes identified in the CDD and the CPD.
Concept of Operations (CONOPS)--
A high level concept whose purpose is to describe a problem that combatant commanders may face, objectives to solve problem, desired effects, capabilities needed to achieve effects, and sequenced actions that describe the employment concept.
Course of Action (COA)--The COA is a planning and decision process that culminates in a MAJCOM decision. The COA includes a series of alternative program choices developed by the MDA or his designate, presented to a MAJCOM commander and that once a specific COA is selected, becomes a formal agreement between the MDA and the operator (MAJCOM Commander) that clearly articulates the performance, schedule, and cost expectations of the program. The COA provides the basis for the Technology Development Strategy during the Technology Development Phase. The COA becomes the basis for the SAMP.
DoD Components--The DOD components consist of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the combatant commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, DOD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the Department of Defense.
Effects-Based Operations--Military actions and operations designed to produce distinctive and desired effects through the application of appropriate movement, supply, attack, defense, and maneuvers. Effects-based operations focuses on functional, systemic, and psychological effects well beyond the immediate physical result of a tactical or operational event. Furthermore, it is equally concerned with military actions and operations that trigger additional effects beyond those desired. Sufficiency--Estimates used during capability analysis that answer the question "Do we have enough (troops, aircraft, supplies, etc.?" Sufficiency ratings will be used to determine overall health and risk of a capability.
Functional Capabilities Board (FCB)--
Tradespace--Selection among alternatives with the intent of obtaining the optimal, achievable system configuration. Often a decision is made to opt for less of one parameter in order to achieve a more favorable overall system result.
